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Recognition and Organizational
Picketing: Limitations on
a Non-Certified Union
This Note, like the preceding one, analyzes one of the
problems that have arisen under section 8(b)(7)(C) of the
National Labor Relations Act, which was enacted in
1959 to limit recognition or organizational picketing. The
author of this Note reviews the possible interpretations
and the practical problems arising under the proviso that
exempts informational picketing not causing a work stop-
page from the requirements of this section. He concludes
that all the circumstances should be relevant in determin-
ing whether there is an object of recognition or organiza-
tion and whether the picketing is not for the sole purpose of
advertising non-unionization. Even if advertising is the
sole purpose for the picketing, however, any incident of
stoppage should taint the picketing to the extent of stop-
page.
INTRODUCTION
The growth in the economic and social strength of organized
labor has prompted a corresponding increase in the demand for
legislative controls over the exercise of its power. Congress added
section 8(b) (7) to the National Labor Relations Act in 1959 to
place new limitations on picketing designed to force an employer
to recognize or bargain with an uncertified union or to force em-
ployees to designate an uncertified union as their bargaining rep-
resentative.' Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this section prohibit
picketing with the object of recognition or organization where the
employer has lawfully recognized another union and a representa-
1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (Supp.
1m, 1962), amending National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(b), 49
Stat. 449 (1935) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. Certification is usually by
the NLRB. The statute, however, does not preclude the possibility of a
state certification. See Getreu v. Bartenders Union, 181 F. Supp. 738
(N.D. Ind. 1960). See generally McDermott, Recognition and Organiza-
tional Picketing Under the Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 LAB.
LJ. 727, 730 (1960).
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tion issue cannot be raised under section 9(c)2 or where there has
been a valid NLRB election within the preceding year.3
Recognition or organizational picketing is prohibited in any
case under subparagraph (C) 4 unless the union files a petition'
2. Under § 9(c)(3), the Board cannot consider a claim for recog-
nition for one year following an election. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3), as amended, § 159(c)(3) (Supp. III, 1962). The
grounds for establishing the invalidity of a contract in the "contract-bar"
cases (where the existence of a contract with one union bars the election
petition of another) could arguably apply to defeat the "lawful recogni-
tion" requirement of § 8(b)(7)(A). See Feldblum, Section 8(b)(7): The
Case of the Puzzling Provisos, 12 LAB. L.J. 502, 507-08 (1961).
A certification by the NLRB is the clearest proof that the labor organiza-
tion has a right to represent the employees. Lawful recognition, however,
does not require certification. See Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 129
N.L.R.B. 1459 (1961). The distinction between certification and lawful rec-
ognition is important because even though a lawfully recognized union
does not violate subparagraph (A), it can nonetheless violate subparagraph(C). See Teamsters Union Local 705, 130 N.L.R.B. 558 (1961).
3. Subparagraph (B) prohibits organizational picketing, as subparagraph(A) does not, where the employees have voted against unionization.
4.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . ..
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or
cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing
or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor or-
ganization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or re-
quiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor
organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such
labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such
employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not
to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing:
Provided, That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall
forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the
absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor
organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be
appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further,
That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit
any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ
members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an
effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any
other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver
or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
NLRA § 8(b)(7)(C), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (Supp.
III, 1962). See generally Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB:
Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 78 (1963); Note, 69 YALE L.J.
1393 (1960).
5. A filing by anyone would satisfy the terms of subparagraph (C).
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relation
Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 268 (1960). The burden of filing is on the
union, however, for it must face the sanctions outlined by the statute.
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for an election within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed
30 days.6 The second or "publicity" proviso to subparagraph
(C), however, permits picketing otherwise prohibited by that sub-
paragraph that is for the purpose of publicizing the failure of an
employer to employ union members or to have a contract with a
union, unless it causes secondary employees to refuse to perform
services. A union that violates subparagraph (C) is subject to a
cease and desist order7 and the mandatory injunction provisions of
section 10(1);8 because of the procedural delay involved in ef-
fectuating a cease and desist order, the injunction is perhaps the
most effective means of enforcing section 8(b) (7) (C). Also the
union will be subject to the provision for an expedited election
under the first proviso to (C). 1 ° Thus, when a union engages in
6. It has generally been held that Congress intended the 30 days as the
outer limit and that the Board has the power to fix a shorter period as
"reasonable" where the circumstances warrant. See, e.g., District 65, Retail,
Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, 52 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1963); Sapulpa Typo-
graphical Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1568 (1962); Cuneo v. Shoe Workers, 181
F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1960). See generally Aaron, The Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1109
(1960).
7. Since section 8(b)(7) creates an unfair labor practice, the Board is em-
powered to issue a cease and desist order and to petition the circuit court
for enforcement. NLRA § 10(a), (e), 49 Stat. 453-54 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (e) (1958).
8. NLRA § 100), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (Supp. IMI, 1962). The statute provides that the regional attorney shall
make a preliminary investigation and shall petition the district court for a
temporary injunction if he has "reasonable cause to believe" that there is
an unfair labor practice. Thereupon, "the district court shall have jurisdic-
tion to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it
deems just and proper . . . ." The statutory criterion of "reasonable cause"
has been interpreted to give the courts a wide range of discretion. See,
e.g., Kennedy v. Los Angeles Joint Executive Bd., 192 F. Supp. 339,
341 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Cavers v. Teamsters "General" Local No. 200, 188
F. Supp. 185, 188 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
9. The time required to obtain a temporary injunction is considerably
less than the time required to obtain a cease and desist order. Compare
Elliott v. Sapulpa Typographical Union, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 68, 615(N.D. Okla. 1959) (temporary injunction issued December 9, 1959), with
Sapulpa Typographical Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1568 (1962) (cease and desist
order issued August 17, 1962). If the Board must petition for enforcement
of the cease and desist order, the permanent sanctions are further de-
layed. See, e.g., Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 127 N.L.R.B. 958
(1960) (cease and desist order issued June 1, 1960), enforced, 289 F.2d
41 (2d Cir. 1961) (enforcement granted April 17, 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 833 (1961).
10. If the union fails to submit a timely election petition, the case will
be referred to the regional board for an election "without regard to the
provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial
interest on the part of the labor organization" when a petition is finally
filed. NLRA § 8(b)(7)(C), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C)
(Supp. 111, 1962). According to Professor Cox, legal advisor to both p-
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recognition or organizational picketing, it will be subject to an
election whether it complies with subparagraph (C) by filing an
election petition or pickets illegally by not filing. In either case, if
the union loses the election, it is prohibited from picketing for one
year under subparagraph (B). In addition, section 9(c) (3) pre-
vents the filing of another election petition during that year.'1 If
the union wins the election, however, it is certified as the bar-
gaining representative of the employees, and section 8(b) (7) be-
comes inapplicable.
One of the most litigated problems arising under subparagraph
(C) concerns the interpretation of the publicity proviso, which
permits picketing designed to publicize the lack of unionization
unless it causes a work stoppage. This proviso could be interpret-
ed either as an exception to the general prohibition on recogni-
tion or organizational picketing or as a prohibition on any picket-
ing that causes a work stoppage. Interpreting the proviso to per-
mit recognition or organizational picketing that is limited to the
purpose of publicizing the lack of unionization within the picketed
establishment makes necessary the definition and classification
of the various types of picketing. The first determination that
must be made is whether the picketing has the proscribed recog-
nition or organizational objective; if such an object is found, it be-
comes necessary to determine whether the picketing is for the pur-
litical parties (see 105 CONG. REC. 6109 (1959)), Congress intended "to
speed up all elections." Cox, supra note 5, at 268 (1959). Logically con-
strued, the statute does not support such an interpretation. It does not
seem reasonable that Congress would incorporate such a significant change
in the NLRA in a proviso to a subparagraph. Moreover, where an expedit-
ed election is unavailable, the union cannot circumvent the normal re-
quirements of § 9(c) by accompanying its petition for an election with
recognitional picketing. See Local 57, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 51 L.R.
R.M. 1061 (1962); Redondo Lingerie Div. of Chic Lingerie, Inc., 48 L.R.
R.M. 1127 (1961). See also NLRB v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 289 F.2d
41 (2d Cir. 1961); Reed v. Roumell, 185 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
A statement by former Senator Kennedy further indicates that Con-
gress intended that the Board follow normal election procedures where there
is no violation of § 8(b)(7)(C). He suggested that "a union may use pickets
in an effort to organize until there is an election in which the NLRB can
determine the employees' wishes. But a union which is stopping truck de-
liveries or other employees would not be allowed to avoid an election."
105 CONG. REC. 17327 (1959). Thus, subparagraph (C) allows a union to
picket without employee support, but its right to continue picketing must
be tested by an election. See Come, Picketing Under the 1959 Amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act, N.Y.U. 13TH ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE ON LABOR 185, 188-89 (1960). If the union complies with (C) and
files an election petition within a reasonable time, it will prolong its op-
portunity for picketing since normal election procedures require more
time. See Note, 69 YALE L.J.1393, 1419 & n.i 12 (1960).
11. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1958), as amended, § 159(c)(3) (Supp. III, 1962).
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pose described in the publicity proviso. Even if the recognition or
organizational picketing is for the permitted purpose, there is the
issue of whether the picketing has caused "any individual employed
by any other person . . .not to pick up, deliver or transport any
goods or not to perform any services.' - The purpose of this Note
will be to consider these problems of interpretation and applica-
tion arising under subparagraph (C) of section 8(b) (7)."
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLICITY PROVISO
In 1961, the National Labor Relations Board concluded that pic-
keting, regardless of its object, was illegal whenever it had the
work stoppage effect proscribed in the section 8(b) (7) (C) pub-
licity proviso.'4 After a change in personnel, however, the Board
in 1962 rejected this interpretation and concluded that the publicity
proviso to section 8(b) (7) (C) was designed only to protect rec-
ognition and organizational picketing that would otherwise be pro-
scribed-under that section.'5
12. NLRA § 8(b)(7)(C), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C)
(Supp. 111, 1962).
13. The drafting of this section has been severely criticized. See, e.g.,
Aaron, supra note 6, at 1100; Come, supra note 10, at 199; Young,
Picketing Under the 1959 Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, N.Y.U. 13TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 213, 218 (1960).
14. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel Employees, 130 N.LR.B. 570
(1961), rev'd, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Crown Cafe-
teria]. See Chefs Local 89, 130 N.L.R.B. 543 (1961) modified, 135 N.L.R.B.
1173 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Stork Restaurant].
15. Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962), 76 HARV. L. REV. 647(1963). Arguably, the decisions in Stork Restaurant and Crown Cafe-
teria were limited to recognition and organizational picketing, and the 1962
Board based its construction of the original opinions upon a misunderstand-
ing of ambiguous language. In the first Stork case, the Board stated
that "we assume without deciding that the picketing became information-
al" and held that it was illegal because of a stoppage effect. 130 N.LR.B.
at 546. Similar language appears in Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
127 N.L.R.B. 958, 971 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961). The earlier decision may have referred to pic-
keting that advertises lack of unionization, generally regarded as recog-
nition or organizational in nature, when speaking of "informational
picketing." Furthermore, Members Rodgers and Leedom, two of the three
members who wrote the earlier decision and who remained on the Board,
dissented in 1962 and adhered to that opinion. They did not, however,
indicate that they had ever believed that the proviso applied to picketing
that has no illegal objective. Instead, they agreed with the majority that
the proviso "carves out" an exception to the general bar of § 8(b)(7),
stating that "by means of a proviso [Congress] . . . exempted such so-
called informational picketing from a general prohibition applicable to
all recognition or organizational picketing." Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B.
1183., 1186-87 (1962). McLeod v. Chefs Local 89, 280 F.2d 760 (1960),
modified, 286 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1961) (injunction should issue for speci-
fied hours during the day).
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Both the structure and the overall statutory scheme of section
8(b) (7) support the 1962 Board's interpretation. Since a proviso
is a qualification of, or an exception to, the general provisions of
a statute,'6 the publicity proviso of section 8(b)(7) should only
apply if the picketing comes within the terms of section 8(b)
(7). 11 Moreover, debate at the time the proviso was introduced
makes clear that Congress intended it to restrict the scope of
subparagraph (C). Congress believed that all organizational pic-
keting would be prohibited in the absence of such a proviso and,
therefore, amended the bill to protect the "traditional and essen-
tial rights of workingmen seeking to improve conditions of em-
ployment."'" An analysis of the other provisions of section 8(b)
(7) adds support to the current Board's view. Subparagraph (A)
prohibits recognition or organizational picketing by one union
For an example of statements in the legislative history that seem to
conclude that informational picketing is barred where it causes stoppage,
see NLRB, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORT-
ING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 1817, 1818 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
LEGIS. HIST.] (remarks of Representative Hagen) ("so-called informational
picketing"); id. at 1820, 1821 (remarks of Representative Pucinski) ("purely
informational picketing"); id. at 1840, 1841 (remarks of Representative Weis)
(same). The Congressmen seem to have been referring to informational pic-
keting that is recognition or organizational and therefore protected by the
proviso unless it causes a stoppage. Other statements reveal that the type
of picketing covered by the proviso was often referred to as "informational
picketing." E.g., 105 CONG. REC. 17898 (1959) (remarks of former Senator
Kennedy); 2 LEGIs. HIST. 1811, 1812 (remarks of Representative Griffin).
16. Ruling on the scope of a proviso similar to that in § 8(b)(7)(C), the
United States Supreme Court said: "It is to except something from the op-
erative effect, or to qualify or restrain the generality, of the substan-
tive enactment to which it is attached .... ." Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S.
427, 435 (1922). See Feldblum, supra note 2, at 520.
17. There is some indication, however, that the proviso was designed
to bar otherwise permissible picketing where it has a stoppage effect.
Although the general terms of § 8(b)(7) prohibit only picketing with a
proscribed object, the proviso applies to "any picketing or other public-
ity." The commentators have not, however, attached significance to the
phrase "other publicity." See Feldblum, supra note 2, at 523-24. See also
Dunau, A Preliminary Look at Section 8(b)(7), 48 GEO. L.J.
371, 378-79 (1959), where it is suggested that this phrase be ignored since
"other publicity" was never initially prohibited under § 8(b)(7). See
also Note, 69 YALE L.J. 1393, 1416 (1960), where it is suggested that this
phrase merely serves to overrule earlier Board decisions,
18. 105 CONG. REC. 17898 (1959). Former Senator Kennedy indicat-
ed that this was one of the important changes in the Landrum-Griffin
bill made by the conference committee. He further indicated that "purely
informational picketing cannot be curtailed under the conference report,
although even this privilege would have been denied by the Landrum-
Griffin measure." See Ibid. The conference report was the same as the
enacted section. 2 LEGIs. HIST. 1452-53, 1738-39. The House bill referred
to was substantially the same as the bill as enacted except that it did not
contain the publicity proviso. See 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1527. See also 105 CONG.
REC. 6649 (1959) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
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where another union has been lawfully recognized and a represen-
tation issue cannot be raised under section 9(c). It is designed,
therefore, to "give effect to the will of the majority and to protect
the employer against economic pressure intended to compel him
to violate the law (by breaking his contract or ignoring certifica-
tion) or to punish him for compliance."' 9 Subparagraph (B) pro-
hibits recognition or organizational picketing where there has been
an NLRB election within the preceding year. It is designed to quiet
the disrupting aftermath of a labor dispute and an election."
Both of these subparagraphs apply to situations where the ques-
tion of recognition and organization has been settled by a lawful
recognition of some other union or by a vote against unionization.
On the other hand, subparagraph (C) applies where recognition
and organization efforts are appropriate-where a question of rep-
resentation may appropriately be raised under the act-by pro-
hibiting such picketing unless an election petition is filed within a
reasonable time.2 Since the need for restrictions in such a situa-
tion seems less compelling, Congress made legal through the pub-
licity proviso to subparagraph (C) limited recognition or organi-
zational picketing for an unlimited time.
The statutory language of subparagraph (C) and its publicity
proviso could be interpreted to mean that there is no violation of
section 8(b) (7) (C) unless a work stoppage results.? Under such
19. Cox, supra note 5, at 264.
20. Although subparagraph (3) will normally protect both employer
and employees, it may restrict the latter where, due to changing attitudes
or new personnel, a majority join the union during the year following an
election.
The real objective of section 8(b)(7)(B), therefore, would seem to be
industrial stability. Organizational campaigns and representation elec-
tions are highly disturbing events and, at least from the employer's
point of view, can have profoundly deleterious effects on employee
morale and production ....
In effect, therefore, Congress has determined that industrial sta-
bility is of greater social importance than the unrestricted freedom of
employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.
Aaron, supra, note 6. See also Wollett, Organizational Picketing and Re-
lated Activity, SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS DIS-
CLOSURE ACT OF 1959 at 920, 927 (Slovenko ed. 1961).
21. This requirement may hamper the union organizational activity sev-
erely, for filing will afford little relief for a union that has no prior con-
tact with the employees since it would probably lose an election and, as a
result, will be barred from picketing for one year. NLRA § 8(b)(7)(B),
73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (Supp. III, 1962); see Retail
Store Employees Union, 134 N.L.R.B. 686 (1961). On the other hand, the
union does have a reasonable time, not to exceed 30 days, in which it may
picket. After filing, the union may picket until the election, which may not
take place for some time. See Note, 69 YALE LJ. 1393, 1419 n.l 12 (1960).
22. See Olender, Standards Picketing Under Section 8(b)(7)(C), 12 LAB.
19631 NOTES 1037
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an interpretation, any picketing that causes a stoppage would seem
to be a violation of subparagraph (C); picketing that does not
cause a stoppage, however, would not be violative of subparagraph
(C) despite a clear intent to force recognition. While this inter-
pretation simplifies the task of applying the proviso by focusing
on results rather than intent,2" it produces an inexplicable varia-
tion in the language of the main clause, which applies only to pic-
keting with "an object" of recognition and organization.24 Fur-
thermore, if Congress had intended the fact of a work stoppage
alone to be determinative of a violation of section 8(b) (7) (C),
that result could have been achieved without the use of the "pur-
pose" language in the proviso.
II. A PROHIBITED OBJECT UNDER 8(b) (7)
Although the Board members apparently are in agreement that
the proviso applies only to picketing that is within the general
terms of section 8(b) (7) (C), 2" they nevertheless disagree over
its application to the facts of a particular case. Subsequent to the
change in personnel, a majority of the Board altered the previous
course of Board opinions by narrowing the situations in which it
will find a prohibited object and by broadening the situations in
which it will find picketing protected by the proviso. In this way,
the present Board has considerably narrowed the scope of section
8 (b) (7), especially subparagraph (C).
Picketing by an uncertified union is prohibited under sec-
tion 8 (b) (7) when it has as "an object" the "forcing or requiring"
of recognition, bargaining, or organization. The Board has ignored
the "forcing or requiring" language 6 and has concentrated on
whether the picketing has a recognition or organizational objec-
tive. Such an interpretation arguably fails to give effect to what
appears to be strong statutory language. At the time Congress
drafted section 8(b) (7), however, the Board and the courts had
accorded similar treatment to the same language in section 8(b)
(4).27 Had Congress desired to avoid such an interpretation for
L.J. 739, 744 (1961); Cox, supra note 5, at 267; cf., Feldblum, supra note
2, at 518.
23. See Cox, supra note 5, at 267.
24. See Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 307 F.2d 197
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Getreu v. Bartenders Union, 181 F. Supp. 738 (N.D.
Ind. 1960); Phillips v. Garment Workers Union, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 68,
725 (M.D. Tenn. 1959); Culinary Workers Union, 134 N.L.R.B. 1505
(1961); Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union, 133 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1961).
25. See note 15 supra.
26. Cf. Dunau, supra note 17, at 373.
27. NLRA § 8(b)(4)(C), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C)
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section 8(b) (7), it could have used different terminology. In ad-
dition, the Board had developed a presumption that persons in-
tend the foreseeable consequences of their actions before the sec-
tion was drafted.2 Thus, if the picketing had a tendency to "force
or require" recognition or organization, it would be presumed that
such a result was the "object" of the picketing. Such a presump-
tion would seem necessary, for rarely is a union so imprudent that
it openly admits a prohibited object 29
This general approach is too broad, however, if it includes all
picketing simply because it tends to produce organization by means
of increasing the prestige and publicizing the strength of or-
ganized labor." Such a broad construction would render mean-
ingless the-statutory definition of a proscribed object since it would
have been sufficient for Congress simply to proscribe "picketing."
Moreover, such a construction may be unconstitutional where
picketing is equivalent to free speech." For these reasons, some
courts have determined that the section should only apply where
(1958); see, e.g., Douds v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 224 F.2d 49
(2d Cir. 1955); Douds v. Knitgoods Workers, 148 F. Supp. 615, 617 (E.
D.N.Y. 1957); Local 745, Dallas Gen. Drivers, 118 N.L.R.B. 1251,
1253, 1259-60 (1957); Bonnaz Local 66, 111 N.L.R.B. 82, 88-90
(1955); Note, 69 YALE LJ. 1393, 1398 (1960).
28. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). This rule
apparently applies to § 8(b)(7). See Madden v. International Hod Car-
riers, 277 F.2d 688, 692-93 (7th Cir. 1960).
29. See International Ladies Garment Workers, 49 L.R.R.M. 1473, 1474
(1962).
30. Purely informational picketing that has no ultimate objective of
recognition and organization is probably limited to "ally" or "struck work"
picketing. Feldblum, supra note 2, at 522.
31. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), where the Court
held invalid on its face a statute that made picketing to interfere with a
business of another a misdemeanor. The Court indicated that the word
"picket" was too vague and could include almost any means of pub-
licity. Sweeping language in Thornhill suggested that picketing was equiva-
lent to free speech; this, however, has been modified in subsequent deci-
sions. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284,
289 (1957) (no deprivation of free speech to enjoin organizational picket-
ing); Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532
(1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949);
Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942); Carpenters Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725 (1942); Milkwagon Drivers Union v. Mea-
dowmoore Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941). See generally Williams, Freedom
To Speak-But Only Ineffectively, 38 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1960). See also
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc.,
50 L.R.R.M. 2160 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1962), 1962 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 475.
The doctrine of Thorihill v. Alabama is still active, however. See Chauffeurs
Union 795 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (per curiam opinion, citing
Thornhill). See also Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201, 202 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring). There is still, therefore, an area of picketing
that is protected, but picketing may be limited constitutionally in many
1963] NOTES 1039
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there is an immediate illegal objective;32 a remote tendency to
improve labor organizations should be beyond the scope of the
"forcing or requiring" language. To effectuate the purposes of
section 8(b) (7), any picketing should be found to have the pro-
scribed object where the employer would reasonably believe that
the only way to eliminate the picket line would be by recognizing
the union or the employees would reasonably believe that the only
way they could avoid unsettling effects of the picket line would
be by designating the union as their bargaining representative.
Whether picketing has a prohibited object under section 8
(b) (7) depends upon the facts in a particular case, and no single
fact should be given conclusive weight in all cases. The members of
the Board agree that some union picketing is clearly tainted with
a recognition or organizational objective. When an uncertified union
pickets in protest to an employer's withdrawal of recognition, for
example, the Board has been unanimous in finding an illegal ob-
jective-the restoration of recognition.33 In other situations, how-
ever, the Board has vacillated. Where a union protests the dis-
charge of employees, the most apparent goal is reinstatement and
not recognition. The Board once reasoned that this, too, was illegal
because reinstatement meant hiring union men, which would nec-
essarily entail bargaining.34 The Board has recently rejected this
reasoning and has concluded that section 8(b) (7) does not apply
to picketing in protest of discharge and for the purpose of ob-
taining reinstatement.35 While reinstatement would not usually
require bargaining because the prior employment relationship
situations. Thus, the purpose of picketing will be relevant, for "absent an
unlawful objective, a statutory restraint of peaceful picketing could raise
constitutional questions." McLeod v. Chefs Local 89, 280 F.2d 760,
765 (2d Cir. 1960) (Waterman, J., concurring).
32. Graham v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 188 F. Supp. 847, 855-56 (D.
Mont. 1960); Brown v. Department & Specialty Store Employees, 187 F.
Supp. 619, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1960), af/'d, 284 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 934 (1961). This distinction between an immediate
and a remote objective is available to determine whether picketing is de-
signed to force or require recognition. It should not be confused, however,
with the distinction suggested by the Board in 1961 that the publicity
proviso to subparagraph (C) protects picketing that has an ultimate rather
than a present goal of recognition or organization. See Crown Cafeteria,
130 N.L.R.B. 570 (1961), rev'd, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962).
33. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 135 N.L.R.B. 851 (1962); In-
ternational Typographical Union, 135 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962) (Chariton
Press, Inc.); International Hod Carrier's Union Local 840, 135 N.L.R.B.
1153 (1962) (Blinne Construction Co.).
34. E.g., Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 N.L.R.B. 558 (1961);
Lewis Food Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 870 (1956).
35. Local 259, Int'l Union, UAW, 133 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1961), over-
ruling Lewis Food Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 890 (1956); accord, MeLeod v.
Local 140, Bedding Workers, 207 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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would serve to establish wages and conditions of employment,'
bargaining may be necessary. In some cases, for example, the em-
ployer is unwilling to reinstate the discharged worker with
seniority."7 If reinstatement is the purpose of the picketing, the
facts in each case should dictate whether bargaining is necessary
to that purpose. If the success of the picketing depends upon
compelling the employer to bargain with the picketing union
concerning wages or conditions of the employees upon reinstate-
ment, the picketing should be within the prohibitory scope of
section 8(b) (7), and the union should be required to file an elec-
tion petition. 8
The Board once felt that picketing in protest of substandard
wages and conditions had the objective of forcing or requiring the
employer to recognize and bargain with the picketing union. 9
It has recently rejected this view, however, and has concluded
that "a union may legitimately be concerned that a particular em-
ployer is undermining area standards of employment" without at-
tempting to obtain recognition or organization."' Adhering to
the original Board reasoning, two Board members have argued
that due to the many complicated factors involved in adjusting
the union's standards to the needs of a particular business, a
change in wages and conditions would have to be negotiated.
Such negotiations, they maintain, constitute bargaining."1 Even
in the absence of negotiations, however, "standards picketing"
36. See, e.g., McLeod v. Local 140, Bedding Workers, 207 F. Supp.
525 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
37. In some cases, the employer may have promised the replacements
seniority over the absent employees to get the replacements to work. See
generally Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 232 F.2d 158 (4th
Cir. 1956), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957).
38. Bargaining over these matters has been reserved for the agent that
is the representative of a majority of the employees. NLRA § 9(a), 49
Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
39. International Hod Carriers Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 78 (1961) (Calu-
ment Contractors Ass'n), rev'd, 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961). Although this
case involved NLRA § 8(b)(4)(C), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (Supp. III, 1962), the language in that section is
similar to that in § 8(b)(7).
40. International Hod Carriers Union, 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961) (Calu-
ment Contractors Ass'n), reversing 130 N.L.R.B. 78 (1961). See Cosentino
v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 200 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mo. 1961) (tempo-
rary injunction denied; no reasonable cause to believe picketing was il-
legal); Local 107, Int'l Hod Carriers Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1962); Lo-
cal 741, United Ass'n of Journeymen, 50 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1962); Local
344, Retail Clerks Ass'n, 136 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1962); Houston Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962). In all of these cases,
Members Rodgers and Leedom dissented.
41. Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962)
(dissent).
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should arguably be considered recognition or organizational pic-
keting. The natural result of such picketing would be a change in
the wages and conditions of employment; this resembles bargain-
ing, for the union makes a demand and supports it with economic
pressure.42 Conceivably, however, a union may only intend to
counteract the competitive strength of the picketed employer in or-
der to improve the position of organized employers and be un-
concerned with recognition or organization.43
Although the Board's position takes account of varying fact
situations and provides both for cases where picketing would not
tend to produce bargaining" and for cases where "bargaining"
will be the result of standards picketing, the Board in the last two
years has been reluctant to find a prohibited object where the
picketing publicizes substandard wages and conditions.4  Pro-
fessor Archibald Cox, on the other hand, has suggested that stand-
ards picketing should raise a presumption of a prohibited ob-
ject. 6 His view seems to be based on the probability that an em-
ployer will be under pressure from the picketing activity to alter
his wage rate and conditions of employment. Since the purpose
of section 8(b) (7) is, in part, to require a union to become the
certified representative of the employees before it applies such
pressure, 7 this presumption may better effectuate the policy of
the section. Professor Cox's view does not preclude the union from
showing that it in fact was interested only in counteracting the
competitive strength of the substandard employer.
Picketing solely in protest of an employer unfair labor practice
42. See Meltzer, supra note 4, at 91, where the author suggests that
the prior Board position that picketing for a demand normally made in
collective bargaining is recognition picketing should be retained since
Congress apparently enacted § 8(b)(7) in approval of these earlier Board
opinions and because an expansive reading of the section is necessary to
give it effect.
43. Whenever a union pickets a nonunion employer, it is strengthening
the position of organized labor by improving the status of firms that recog-
nize a union. This, however, should not be a consideration. The test of
whether the picketing is subject to § 8(b)(7) should be whether the em-
ployer would feel compelled to recognize or bargain with the union to elimi-
nate the picketing. If he does, the union should be subject to a Board-
conducted election.
44. The Board has considered the possibility that picketing in protest of
substandard conditions could be recognitional. Local 107, Int'l Hod Car-
riers Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1962). The Board noted that the union
would not refer union men to the picketed employer and suggested that
this implied that the union was not interested in organizing the employer's
business. Id. at 1546.
45. See cases cited note 40 supra.
46. Cox, supra note 5, at 267. See also Meltzer, supra note 4, at 93-
94.
47. Cf. text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
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is considered free of recognition or organizational objectives"'
except where the employer has unlawfully withheld recognition. 9
This picketing may be motivated, however, by a desire to attain
recognition or organization even where the legends indicate a pro-
test over matters unrelated to such purposes. In one instance, for
example, the International Ladies Garment Workers picketed an
employer to protest unfair labor practices only after the Garment
Workers had lost an election when it had knowledge of the prac-
tices prior to the election.5" In another situation, although an ade-
quate remedy had been provided by the NLRB, the uncertified
union picketed in protest of employer discrimination and coercion
of employees.51 Thus, the surrounding circumstances-the fact
that the union failed to protest prior to election or the fact that
the unfair labor' practices had been remedied-may suggest that
the union is not genuinely concerned with merely protesting the
employer unfair labor practices. Where a union pickets to protest
an employer action under circumstances that suggest that such a
protest is a disguise for a more basic motive of recognition or or-
ganization, an employer, realizing that his unfair labor practice
is no longer a current issue, would reasonably believe that he
must recognize the union to be free of the picket line. Therefore,
the Board should look to the underlying purpose and intent of the
picketing and prevent it from being used as an instrument to achieve
results that are inconsistent with the purpose of section 8(b) (7).
Moreover, such an approach rests upon the language of section
8 (b) (7), which focuses on the object of the picketing.
Picketing to advise the public of the employer's lack of a
union contract or failure to employ union members is specifically
protected under the publicity proviso in subparagraph (C) so long
as it does not cause a work stoppage. It is necessary, nonetheless,
to determine whether such picketing is for a prohibited object be-
cause if it is found free of a recognition or organizational object,
48. See, e.g., Teamsters "General" Local 200, 134 N.L.R.B. 670
(1961); Local Joint Executive Bd., 132 N.L.R.B. 737 (1961). See also
105 CONG. REC. 17327 (1959) (remarks of former Senator Kennedy).
49. International Hod Carriers Union, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
50. International Ladies Garment Workers, 50 L.R.R.M. 1473, 1474
(1962) (held picketing for recognition).
51. Local Joint Executive Bd., 132 N.L.R.B. 737, 740-41 (1961); ac-
cord, Kennedy v. Los Angeles Joint Executive Bd., 192 F. Supp. 339
(S.D. Cal. 1961) (petition for temporary injunction granted). In Local Joint
Executive Bd., the union notified the employer that it would only pic-
ket to advertise the unfair labor practices committed by the employer after
it had lost an election. The signs stated that the employer, "1. Formed a
fraudulent labor union; 2. Spied on its employees; 3. Discriminated against
union members." 132 N.L.R.B. at 739-40. Prior to the election the
union had filed charges of a violation of §§ 8(a)(1), (3).
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section 8(b) (7) becomes inapplicable.52 Although there is some
judicial opinion that there is no "reasonable cause to believe" that
such picketing is recognition or organizational, 3 other courts and
the Board have indicated that this picketing is recognition or or-
ganizational in nature. 4 Advertising the lack of unionization
is similar to picketing that protests substandard wages and condi-
tions; therefore, the union may be interested solely in weakening
the competitive strength of the employer to the advantage of or-
ganized employers.55 Arguably, picketing that merely advertises
an employer's lack of unionization would not by itself be likely to
induce recognition or organization. 6 To alleviate the economic
pressure upon the business that may result from advertising the
lack of unionization, however, the employer may be induced to sign
a union contract or the employees may be induced to join a union.
Moreover, the publicity proviso in subparagraph (C) is an indi-
cation that Congress believed that picketing for this purpose may
have a recognition or organizational objective; otherwise, there
would be no reason for adding such a proviso to the section."7
52. See, e.g., Cosentino v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 200 F. Supp. 112
(E.D. Mo. 1961); Stork Restaurant, 135 N.L.R.B. 1173 (1962).
53. See Graham v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, 188 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mont.
1960). See also Brown v. Department & Specialty Store Employees, 187
F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Cal. 1960), ajj'd, 284 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.) cert. de-
nied, 366 U.S. 934 (1961), where the court reasoned that almost any
picketing would have an ultimate goal of recognition or organization, and
concluded:
It is therefore apparent that picketing having an announced purpose
of "truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an em-
ployer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor
organization . . .," must be considered without giving undue emphasis
to the ultimate object of union recognition.
187 F. Supp. at 623. The court also reasoned that the picketing was
merely "advising the public," not recognition or organizational, due to the
"failure of the union to adopt practices more likely to produce recogni-
tion .... " Id. at 624. Arguably, the fact that the picketing was designed
to advise the public should not be significant in determining whether the
picketing has as its objective recognition or organization since virtually any
picketing, whatever its motive, will be so designed. See Feldblum, supra
note 2, at 521 (1961).
54. Kennedy v. Los Angeles Joint Executive Bd., 192 F. Supp. 339
(S.D. Cal. 1961); Penello v. Retail Store Employees, 188 F. Supp. 192
(D. Md. 1960); Local 1199, Drug Employees, 136 N.L.R.B. 1564 (1962);
Local 1265, Dep't Store Employees, 136 N.L.R.B. 335 (1962); Local
182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 135 N.L.R.B. 851 (1962).
55. See generally notes 42-48 supra and accompanying text.
56. Cf. Local 107, Int'l Hod Carriers, 50 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1962).
57. Kennedy v. Los Angeles Joint Executive Bd., 192 F. Supp. 339,
342 (S.D. Cal. 1961); 105 CONG. REC. 18153 (1959) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Griffin).
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III. THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLICITY PROVISO
A union that is not the currently certified representative for the
employees of an employer is prohibited by section 8(b) (7) (C)
from engaging in recognition or organizational picketing against
that employer for an unreasonable period of time, not to exceed
30 days, without filing an election petition. The limitation of sub-
paragraph (C) is not applicable, however, if the recognition or
organizational picketing is "for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public (including consumers) that an employer does not
employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organiza-
tion ....
The Board seems to have no definite standard that must be
met if picketing is to come within the protective terms of the pub-
licity proviso.' It has rejected the standard proposed by a
minority of the Board that picketing should not be protected by the
proviso if there is "independent evidence" of a purpose other than
advertising the fact of non-unionization. 9 In rejecting this test,
the majority of the Board argued that such a test imports "into
the statutory language a criterion with no foundation in the text,
no basis in legislative history and no correlation with the leg-
islative remedies devised to meet the actual problem presented."'
58. At one time, the Board apparently refused to apply the publicity
proviso because of a future rather than a present recognition or organiza-
tional objective. In Crown Cafeteria, the Board stated:
We are satisfied that Congress added the proviso only to make
clear that purely informational picketing, which publicizes the lack
of a union contract or the lack of union organization, and which has
no present object of recognition, should not be curtailed ...
130 N.L.R.B. 570, 572 (1961) (Emphasis added.), rev'd, 135 N.LR.B.
1183 (1962). This distinction, however, has not been determinative in more
recent cases.
59. Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962). The dissenters did not,
however, specify the factors that would constitute independent evidence
sufficient to take picketing out of the protection of the publicity proviso.
Presumably, they referred to the fact that the union representative re-
quested that Crown use the union hiring hall when hiring employees and
that it sign the standard union contract; the trial examiner had concluded
that, "apart from the picketing," the union was seeking recognition. See
Crown Cafeteria, 130 N.L.R.B. 570, 571-72 (1961), adopted in 135
N.L.R.B. 1183, 1186 (1962) (dissent). See also Carpenters Dist. Council,
136 N.L.R.B. 855, 857 (1962) (Member Rodgers, dissenting). This test
would be satisfied in cases where there was solicitation of the employees
shortly before the picketing appeared, id. at 857; where the picketing union
sent a letter to trade organizations to discuss the "unfairness" of the
nonunion standards of the employer, Local 344, Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 136 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1274 (1962) (dissenting opinion); and where a
union representative passed out circulars and solicited memberships, Local
125, Philadelphia Window Cleaners Union, 136 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1962)
(concurring opinion).
60. Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1185 (1962).
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They did not, however, show how this summary rejection
of the "independent evidence" test is supported by an analy-
sis of text, legislative history, or the overall statutory scheme, nor
do they suggest an alternative rule for distinguishing protected
picketing from recognitional or organizational picketing without
the favored purpose. Unless the Board is acting arbitrarily, how-
ever, the cases should reveal a consistent pattern of con-
siderations relied upon by the majority in making such a distinc-
tion. The derivation of a general rule from such a pattern will
make possible a comparison of the positions of the majority and
minority members of the Board in light of the purpose of the pub-
licity proviso.
The Board has consistently found a violation of subparagraph
(C), without any reference to the publicity proviso, where the pic-
ket legends reveal that the picketing is not merely for the purpose
of advertising a lack of unionization. For example, picketing with
a legend reading "We Demand Recognition of the Union" would
not be entitled to protection of the proviso.61 The Board has also
consistently found a violation of subparagraph (C) where the pic-
ket legend indicates that the employer is "unfair."62 Such a legend
indicates that the purpose of the picketing is to compel the em-
ployer to bargain about the terms and conditions of employment
rather than to advise the public. Furthermore, where the picket leg-
end indicates that the employer is "unfair," the picketing may be
an indication to organized labor to observe the picket line because
of a dispute with the employer. The employer, to remove the picket
line, would reasonably believe that he must bargain over the sub-
ject matter of such a dispute. To gain such bargaining status, the
policy of section 8(b) (7) (C) would dictate that an election pe-
61. Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union, 133 N.L.R.B. 1617, 1622(1961). See also Kennedy v. Construction Laborer's Union, 199 F. Supp.
775 (D. Ariz. 1961) (petition for temporary injunction granted). The court
noted that the picket sign indicated that the union desired to organize
and represbnt the employees and found that there was reasonable cause to
believe that the picketing violated § 8(b)(7)(C). Id. at 777. The court did
not consider the applicability of the publicity proviso. But see Bartenders
Union Local 58, 51 L.R.R.M. 1180 (1962), where the placards read "ON
STRIKE-For Renewal of Our Union Contract." The Board dismissed the
complaint; only two members, however, based the dismissal on the protec-
tion of the publicity proviso. Id. at 1181; accord, Getreu v. Bartenders
Union Local 58, 181 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
62. Sapulpa Typographical Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1568 (1962); Local
154, Int'l Typographical Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1312 (1962) (but the Board
relied on the fact that the picketing extended to employee entrances);
cf. Local 1439, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 136 N.L.R.B. 778 (1962) (the
employer was put on the unfair list; the signs read "We Do Not Patronize").
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tition should be filed within a reasonable period of time after the
picketing begins.
A more difficult problem arises where unions model the picket
legends after the language of the publicity proviso." Although
such picketing would appear to be limited to the permitted pur-
pose, it may in fact have the additional purpose of blackmailing
the employer to recognize or the employees to join the union. In
this situation, the Board has found that the picketing was not for
the purpose allowed in the publicity proviso where it takes place
at employee or delivery entrances" or where the picketing union
solicits membership from the employees.65 A demand upon the
employer for recognition has not been sufficient to take the picket-
ing out of the protection of the publicity proviso.66 Arguably,
when the union's organizational activities progress to a point where
it makes direct contact with the employer or the employees con-
cerning recognition or organization, the union should be required
to file a petition for election and to test its right to represent the
employees; if it does not, the employer or his employees should
be able to obtain an expedited election. Such activities would seem
to indicate ,that the picket line is not being used to merely ad-
vise the public, but is being used as an instrument of influence
wielded by the union against the employer or his employees-a
purpose clearly not protected by the publicity proviso.
Where the picket legends comply with the language of the pub-
licity proviso and there is no concurrent evidence of a non-pro-
tected purpose, the Board has refused to consider recognition or
organizational activity occurring prior to the appearance of the pic-
63. E.g., Stork Restaurant, 130 N.L.R.B. 543 (1961), modified, 135
N.L.R.B. 1173 (1962).
64. See Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 50 L.R.R.M. 1410(1962); Local 154, Int'l Typographical Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1312 (1962);
Local 125, Philadelphia Window Cleaners Union, 136 N.LR.B. 1104
(1962); accord, Samoff v. Hotel Employees, 199 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa.
1961).
65. See Local 125, Philadelphia Window Cleaners Union, 136 N.L.R.B.
1104 (1962); Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union, 133 N.L.R.B. 1617(1961); cf. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 219, 134 N.L.R.B. 1680 (1961).
It has been held that there was at least reasonable cause to believe § 8(b)(7)(C) has been violated where the union representative visited with em-
ployees and spoke about the advantages of a union although the legend
merely stated that "This Building is Being Erected by Non-Union Labor."
Alpert v. Local 271, Int'l Hod Carriers Union, 198 F. Supp. 395, 397(D.R.I. 1961) (petition for temporary injunction granted).
66. See Local 154, International Typographical Union, 50 L.R.R.M.
1312 (1962); Culinary Workers Union, 134 N.LR.B. 1505 (1961); ac-
cord, Vincent v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 51 L.R.R.M. 2517 (N.D.
N.Y. 1962); Phillips v. International Ladies Garment Workers, CCH Lab.
Cas. 68, 725 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
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kets to determine the purpose of the current recognition or or-
ganizational picketing. 7 On the other hand, the Board unani-
mously agrees that where there is evidence of a continuing un-
protected purpose, the picketing is not within the proviso."
The Board has refused to consider prior recognition or organi-
zational conduct in determining the objective of the current pic-
keting where the prior conduct occurred before the enactment of
section 8(b) (7) (C). 69 This analysis seems correct since a differ-
ent result would give the section retroactive effect. The reason-
ing used by the Board, however, has an application that extends
beyond the situation where the motive appeared before the enact-
ment of section 8(b) (7). The Board has argued that there should
be no presumption that a prior motive continues;7° therefore, a
union should not be restricted in picketing for the purpose of ad-
vertising lack of unionization merely because of prior activities that
it has discontinued. Instead of completely disregarding the union's
prior motives in its recognition or organizational activities, a more
reasonable approach would seem to be to consider such motives in
determining the purpose of the current picketing unless the union
comes forth with some evidence of a change of motive and tac-
tics.7 ' Imposing this burden of proof upon the union does not
67. International Ladies Garment Workers, 136 N.L.R.B. 524, 536(1962); Local 400, Retail Store Employees, 136 N.L.R.B. 414 (1962); Lo-
cal 1265, Dep't & Specialty Store Employees, 136 N.L.R.B. 335(1962); cf. Local 344, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 136 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1962).
But see Phillips v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 68,
725 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), where the court found at least reasonable cause
to believe that there was a violation although all of the organizational ac-
tivity took place prior to the passage of § 8(b)(7).
68. Automotive Employees Union Local 618, 136 N.L.R.B. 934 (1962);
cf. Cosentino v. Local 618, Automotive Employees, 200 F. Supp. 492 (E.D.
Mo. 1960); Greene v. International Typographical Union, 186 F. Supp.
630 (D. Conn. 1960); Compton v. Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union,
184 F. Supp. 210, 211-12 (D.P.R. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 313 (1st Cir.
1961) (granting a temporary injunction); Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods
Union, 133 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1961); Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters.
127 N.L.R.B. 958, 970 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961).
69. Ibid.
70. This rule was stated prior to the enactment of § 8(b)(7). See NLRB
v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 245 F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 1957), where the
court held that there could be no presumption of continuation of intent
without independent supporting evidence in a § 8(b)(4)(C) case. This
rule has been followed in § 8(b)(7)(C) cases. See Hoffman v. Retail Store
Employees, 206 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (petition for temporary
injunction denied); Greene v. International Typographical Union, 182 F.
Supp. 788 (D. Conn. 1960) (petition for temporary injunction denied);
McLeod v. Chefs Local 89, 181 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y.) (petition
for temporary injunction granted), modified, 280 F.2d 760, 764-65 (2d
Cir. 1960).
71. Such evidence might consist of a repudiation by the union of the
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seem unfair since the union is seeking the protection of the pub-
licity proviso. Furthermore, it is the purpose of the union's conduct
that is in issue, and evidence concerning its motives would prob-
ably be more readily accessible to it than to the employer. Although
it has not formulated a general rule, the Board is apparently con-
sidering only activity that is a part of the picketing to determine
the purpose of the picketing.
Even though the Board has rejected the minority position that
"independent evidence" should be considered, it does in fact look
beyond the statement on the picket sign to determine the purpose
of the picketing.72 Thus, in rejecting the "independent evidence"
concept, the Board seems to have only rejected the relevancy of
factors that do not occur at the site of the picketing."
Considering only factors that are part of the picketing seems
to circumvent the general thrust of subparagraph (C) and its pub-
licity proviso. In rejecting the "independent evidence" test, the
Board argued that the section applies only to picketing; other ac-
tivities are unaffected by its provisions, and recognition or organi-
zational picketing for the purpose specified in the publicity pro-
viso is not limited by the section. Furthermore, the Board argued
that an "independent evidence" test would produce the anoma-
lous result that picketing and other activities when occurring sep-
arately would be legal, but would be illegal when combined. 74
The Board's analysis seems unsound because it assumes that an
"independent evidence" test would prohibit independent organi-
zational activities. Since section 8 (b) (7) proscribes only picketing,
it is clear that independent organizational activities are not limit-
ed by that section.75 Such independent organizational activities
prior illegal motive. A union may, for example, send a letter to the
employer disclaiming its recognitional objectives. The Board has indicat-
ed, however, that it may regard these disclaimers as self-serving. See Car-
quinez Lodge 1492, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 51 L.R.R.M. 1522 (1962);
Local 1439, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 136 N.L.R.B. 778 (1962); Local Joint
Executive Bd., 132 N.L.R.B. 737 (1961). But cf. Cosentino v. Carpenters
Dist., 200 F. Supp. 112, 114 (E.D. Mo. 1961); Graham v. Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n, 188 F. Supp. 847, 857-58 (D. Mont. 1960).
72. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
73. "The thrust of Section 8(b)(7)(C) is directed at picketing. If the
picketing comes within the permissive ambit of that proviso, such picket-
ing, in our opinion, is privileged." Crown Cafeteria, 130 N.L.R.B. 570, 577
(1961), adopted in 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962).
74. Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1185 (1962), 76 HARV. L.
REV. 647, 650 (1963). See also International Ladies Garment Workers,
50 L.R.R.M. 1473, 1475 (1962) (Chairman McCulloch, dissenting).
75. E.g., Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 50 L.R.R.M. 1410
(1962); Culinary Workers, 134 N.L.R.B. 1505 (1961); see 105 CONG.
Rnc. 6648 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan); id. at 6650 (remarks of
Senator Ervin).
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should be relevant, however, to show the purpose that motivates
the uncertified union to set up a picket line. When it enacted sec-
tion 8(b)(7), Congress was concerned with the problem of an
uncertified union forcing recognition or organization upon unwill-
ing employers and employees."6 The section was not intended,
however, to limit the right of workingmen to improve conditions
of employment; therefore, the publicity proviso was enacted to
permit unlimited recognition or organizational picketing for the
purpose of advising the public of the lack of unionization. To de-
termine whether the picketing is for the limited purpose permit-
ted in the publicity proviso or for the purpose of forcing recogni-
tion or organization upon unwilling employers or employees, the
surrounding circumstances, as well as the picketing activity, should
be considered.
IV. EFFECT OF A STOPPAGE UNDER THE
PUBLICITY PROVISO
If the recognition or organizational picketing is found to have
the limited purpose specified in the publicity proviso to section 8
(b) (7) (C), such picketing may continue for an unlimited time
without the filing of an election petition. Even though the proviso
is applicable, however, the picketing may be illegal if it has inter-
fered with pick-ups and deliveries or other employee services.
There is a controversy among Board members over the number of
incidents that must occur before it will find a work stoppage within
the meaning of the publicity proviso.7 7 The majority has indi-
cated that a stoppage must interfere with the employer's business;
it must disrupt his normal business routine and compel him to
modify his usual practicess.7  Members Rodgers and Leedom,
76. Congress intended to curtail the power of a union to use picketing
as a weapon to gain recognition or organization. 105 CONG. REC. 5201
(1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater); id. at 6433 (remarks of Senator
Mundt); id. at 6648 (remarks of Senator McClellan); id. at 6650 (remarks
of Senator Lausche); id. at 6652 (remarks of Senator DiTksen); id. at 15531
(remarks of Representative Griffin); id. at 18153 (remarks of Representa-
tive Borden); id. at 15520 (remarks of Representative Landrum); id. at
17326 (remarks of Senator Goldwater).
77. Arguably, the publicity proviso, which proscribes picketing where
there is an actual stoppage, may be read to give protection in any case
where there is no stoppage in fact; it then would not be illegal to try to
stop pick-ups or deliveries as long as the attempt failed. Such a read-
ing of the proviso, however, would fail to give full consideration to all of
its terms by overlooking the requirement that picketing be for the purpose
described therein. In other words, if the picketing is attempting to stop
deliveries, it seems clear that its purpose is not merely to advise the public
of non-unionization.
78. Bartenders Union Local 58, 51 L.R.R.M. 1180 (1962); Local 429,
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however, have scrutinized the statutory language and conclud-
ed that one stoppage is enough to constitute a violation of the pub-
licity proviso.79 They argue that a single stoppage satisfies the
requirement of the statute that refers to "an effect" inducing
"any individual or any other person" to refuse to deliver "any
goods" or render "any services." Under this analysis, based upon a
literal reading of the statutory language, a finding of an unfair la-
bor practice could hinge upon the actions of one person who
has disregarded the union's direction that pick-ups and deliveries
should continue as usual. Thus, the union could act in good faith
and nonetheless be guilty of causing a stoppage. The Board's pres-
ent position avoids this harsh result by overlooking the literal
language of the statute. Arguably, however, Congress used the
terms "an individual," "any goods," and "any services" to make
clear that such a stoppage "effect" would constitute a violation
of the publicity proviso. The language of the proviso clearly ap-
pears to contemplate much less than a substantial interference
with the employer's business. A literal reading of the language,
however, would place a substantial burden on the union to see
that no stoppage occurs. This burden would seem unduly harsh to
a union acting in good faith to publicize its requests.
Arguably, the single-stoppage rule would not be unfair since
the union is in the best position to see that the picket line has no
adverse effects. Nor is a literal reading of the statute unduly harsh
if the Board considers illegal only that part of the picketing that
causes a stoppage. One court has recognized that sound policy sup-
ports such a result. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has held that an injunction should be effective only during hours
in which a stoppage occurs."' The court reasoned that the stop-
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 51 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1962); San Diego County
Waiters Union, 51 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1962); Local 57, Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 51 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1962); Retail Clerks Union, 51 L.R.R.M. 1053,
1055-56 (1962).
79. Bartenders Union Local 58, 51 L.R.R.M. 1180, 1181 (1962) (dis-
sent); Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 51 L.R.R.M. 1065, 1067
(1962) (concurring opinion); San Diego County Waiters Union, 51 L.R.R.M.
1063, 1065 (concurring opinion); Local 57, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 51
L.R.R.M. 1061, 1063 (1962) (dissent); Retail Clerks Union, 51
L.R.R.M. 1053, 1059 (1962) (dissent). One member of Congress suggested,
in arguing that the addition of the publicity proviso accomplished nothing,
that an employer could direct some employee to refuse to perform services
and this would constitute a stoppage sufficient to make the picketing illegal.
105 CONG. REC. 18142 (1959) (remarks of Representative Roosevelt).
80. McLeod v. Chefs Local 89, 280 F.2d 760 (1960); modified, 286 F.2d
727 (2d Cir. 1961) (Stork Restaurant). In Stork Restaurant, 135 N.L.R.B.
1173 (1962), Member Fanning preferred to enjoin the union only during
delivery hours. See id. at 1177 n.7. In this way, the illegal aspect of the
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page effect of the picketing was its only undesirable aspect and
this could be eliminated without affecting the permissible aspect
of the picketing. Since Congress has determined that picketing to
publicize lack of unionization is permissible under the publicity
proviso to subparagraph (C) except when it causes stoppage, the
only objectionable element of the picketing is the stoppage. Thus,
the legislative objectives would be effectuated by permitting the
picketing for the purpose outlined in the publicity proviso where
possible. Where this can be done through partial removal of the
pickets, there would seem to be no justification for enjoining all of
the picketing."'
CONCLUSION
The Board has derived a logical interpretation of the effect of
the imprecise wording of the publicity proviso in subparagraph
(C), but it has not always given its interpretation the best possible
implementation. The entire section only applies to picketing with
an object of recognition or organization by an uncertified union.
In general, no such object exists where the union is making a
bona fide attempt to reinstate discharged workers, to counter-
act the competitive force of a non-union employer paying substand-
ard wages, or to protest an employer's unfair labor practice. Such
picketing, however, may necessitate negotiations and enable the
uncertified union to act as the representative of the employees, or it
may merely disguise an underlying prohibited object. In these
cases, section 8(b) (7) (C) should apply to require the uncerti-
fied union to become certified in an NLRB election unless the pur-
pose of the picketing comes within the permissive ambit of the pub-
licity proviso.
The Board has not formulated any criterion for determining
activity-that which caused delivery stoppage-would be eliminated, and
the remainder of the activity would continue under the protection of the
publicity proviso. Apparently dissenting members Rodgers and Leedom did
not agree with this view, as Member Fanning joined in the opinion of
Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown who determined that no cease
and desist order should issue.
81. In view of the Second Circuit's doctrine, however, it is doubtful
that the Board could obtain a blanket injunction over all picketing by a
union. Typically, however, the Board's cease and desist order specifically
enjoins only prohibited picketing. See, e.g., Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 51 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1962) (cease and desist from unlawful rec-
ognition and organizational picketing); Local 1199, Drug Employees, 50
L.R.R.M. 1033 (1962) (cease and desist from recognitional picketing).
Possibly the Board intends by these orders to permit picketing that has
no prohibited object and picketing under subparagraph (C) that would
qualify under the publicity proviso. But see Culinary Workers Union,
134 N.L.R.B. 1505 n.1 (1961).
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when picketing comes within the publicity proviso, but apparent-
ly considers relevant only activity that is part of the picketing. This
overlooks the language of the section, which speaks of "object"
and "purpose," and it also overlooks the fact that picketing often
achieves results that are unrelated to the legends on the picket
signs. An examination of all the circumstances, on the other hand,
gives full consideration to the language and the practical effect of
the activity involved.
The Board has also distorted the literal terms of the statute by
requiring a substantial interference with business before it will
find a stoppage. This distortion would be unnecessary if the Board
would consider limiting its cease and desist order to the hours
or locations where picketing caused stoppage, thereby giving the
employer protection from stoppages and permitting the union to
publicize lack of unionization as contemplated by the statute.
